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The intent of the writer in completing this paper is to
present an analysis of the efforts of Middle Managers in the
Marine Corps relative, to the implementation of Project PRIME.
The subject area was chosen, among other reasons, because of the
critical nature of the appraisals made by top management
regarding the performance of these middle managers. The initial
research efforts brought to light three limitations with which
the writer had to cope for the balance of this endeavor.
1. Although the general area of Project PRIME admits of
voluminous reference material, there is an apparent lack of
publications directly relating to the middle management area in
the system.
2. The political Implications surrounding the
installation and implementation of Project PRIMB (including a
review now in process), resulted in a marked hesitancy on the
part of the middle managers interviewed to be directly quoted
iThat this opinion is in fact held by top management
will be documented subsequently.

2even though they were, in the vast majority, unhesitating in
expressing their views on the subject. 1
3. There exists among Marine Corps managers of all
levels a difference of opinion regarding the definition of
several of the basic terms involved, including applicable portions
of Project PRIME itself. The opinions held are not a result of
semantics, but Involve interpretations which are diametrically
opposed on essential attributes of the management system entitled
Project P$IH8t
These limitations make it necessary for the writer to
depend heavily on diverse references for the substantiation of
many of the conclusions drawn herein. As a result, source
documents and personal quotations are often listed from such
varying sources as the Constitution of the United States and a
junior officer in the Marine Corps in order to document a single
assertion.
A similar anomaly appears regarding the portions of this
paper which deal with the development of the various management
systems which have evolved regarding the collection and disburse-
ment of funds by the United States Government. It is often
necessary to discuss the implications of systems and
recommendations which were inaugurated half a century ago in the
same passage with committee meetings which were held during this
year.
^The documentation which follows reflects this fact.
£very attempt has been made to vary the sources of information
in order to substantiate the conclusions drawn herein.

Subject and Approach
The managerial techniques instituted in the Department of
Defense during the past ten years have been the subject of many
critiques, analyses, and explanations. The authors have addressed
every major adjunct of the managerial innovations which have taken
place during the 196o's. Their subject matter gave evidence of a
patent concern with the general or conceptual aspects of these
management techniques, to the virtual exclusion of the practical,
detailed application of the mechanics involved in these management
systems.
Publications concerning these mundane matters are for the
most part limited to the departmental directives and orders
written concerning specifics attendant to the implementation of
the concepts Involved. As a result, the vast preponderance of
reference materials available concern themselves with policies
and procedures directly related to the upper echelons of the
managerial hierarchy. An extensive treatment of this level of
management is totally justified for the changes wrought by them
have been monumental.
Top managers have developed a framework: around which the
entire management effort in the military has been built. In a
comparably short period of time military officers and Defense
Department personnel in senior managerial billets have integrated
their efforts into a homogeneous thrust toward more effective
management of the military complex. They have been responsible
for supervising the establishment of a complicated, intricate

and coordinated series of programs under which the Department of
Defense has made notable advancement in the creation of a form
of scientific management apropos of the military establishment.
The planners have completed their assignment. The spotlight is
shifted herein to the "doers,"— the Middle Managers. The efforts
of the middle managers in the implementation of these systems
are presently being scrutinized by top management.
This paper will investigate the efforts of a small
portion of these middle managers, specifically those in the
United States Marine Corps. The validity of an effort of this
nature arises from the personal experience of the writer as a
former middle manager, and is further strengthened by information
gathered in the initial stages of research in the general area
of management in the Marine Corps.
In 1964 the Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that:
The managers in the field are generally not
prepared to make use of the management tools provided
them by this new (management) system. There is ample
evidence that a concentrated effort must be made by
our middle management at self education in this
regard. 1
Pour years later the succeeding Commandant said:
"We believe that our senior commanders are well
up on the learning curve, but there is an urgent
need to educate middle management. Specifically,
we must improve on their use of the managerial tools
afforded by /Project PRIMfi7 systems. 2
-'-General Wallace M. Greene, Address to the students of
Staff and Command College, Quantico, Virginia, April 17, 1964.
^General Leonard P. Chapman, Jr., Briefing at Pentagon,
Washington, D. C, October 28, 1968.

5Mr. James bright, Fiscal Director for the United States
Marine Corps, expressed his concern in this way:
Vsle have an ample supply of talent among the
Chiefs, but our Indians in the field are neither
motivated nor educated to a degree that will enable
the system to reach its full potential. 1
These mandates for improvement were general in nature and
did not include the specific areas in which improved performance
was mandatory. They were also void of any definitive efforts
through which middle management could bring itself abreast of
these efforts at improved management in the Marine Corps.
Ln executing this endeavor the writer will present a
comparably thorough treatment of the evolution and content of the
basic concepts involved in the Implementation of Project PHIMiJ
managerial systems. The logic of this approach was enhanced by
the results of research performed by the writer in the general
area of middle management in the Marine Corps.
Middle management must recognize the part it plays in the
overall system if these managers are to be properly motivated.
They are or will become directly, if only to a limited degree,
involved in these decisions; and to be as effective as possible
they must have the proper perspective concerning the role they
play in the overall process. Consequently, the writer will
thoroughly discuss the evolution of the systems involved and
relate them to the general interpretations discovered during the
research effort.
*Mt. James '..right, Fiscal Director of the United States
Marine Corps, in an Address to the Students of the I.avy Post-
graduate Financial Management Course, The George Washington
University, Washington, D. C, March 11, 1969.

6The approach employed in presenting the subject matter
will follow these general guidelines . First, the writer will
present a brief outline of the early historical developments
regarding management in military establishments. This effort
will be made in order to establish a logical beginning point for
the subject to be treated herein.
Second, the basis for the present managerial system will
be presented. This portion of the paper will concern itself
with the more recent developments in American governmental and
military bodies intending a more effective use and control of
money spent by the Federal Government. The purpose of this
passage will be to relate the innovations and recommendations made
during the past forty years and how they relate to the management
systems presently being utilized in the Department of Defense.
Third, the Installation and development of the Resources
Management Systems under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
will be discussed. It is with a particular phase of these systems
that the paper is concerned. It is intended that this chapter
describe the overall concept of the Resources Management Systems
in an attempt to establish the proper perspective for the
subsequent presentation concerning Project PRIMS. The impact of
these concepts on the middle manager will be discussed when
apropos.
Fourth, Project PRIMS will be discussed as it exists in
the Marine Corps today. This treatment will be primarily
restricted to those matters which most concern the middle manager;
J
7however, a relationship will be established whenever possible
between the efforts of the middle manager and the total system.
Conclusions and recommendations will terminate this
investigation of Project PRIK3 and the middle manager in the
Marine Corps.
synthesis regarding the performance of individual
managers will be included in the chapter entitled Conclusions
and Recommendations. However, when possible, as the basic
concepts of this management system are discussed, reference will
be made concerning the manner in which they relate to middle
managers. These comments will, of necessity, include periodic
referrals to the fact that the subject matter is viewed from a
vastly different perspective by the adherents to the several
interpretations of the proper definition of Project PRIME,
Excepting the definitions which are included in the
paragraph entitled "Research Question," technical jargon will be
defined as it appears in the paper.
The writer will not specifically refer to the position
that the Marine Comptroller plays in the execution of project
PR I, . This is the result of several considerations. The first
is that the basic definition of manager in the Marine Corps
connotes the idea of command. Comptroller connotes a position of
staff responsibility. It is noted, however, that the performance
of these individuals is essentially interconnected in the practical
application of any management system. As a result. the results
achieved will jointly reflect the efforts of both the Commander

8and the Comptroller as his chief advisor. Secondly, the writer
would have to specifically deal with various commands when
discussing their performance and make judgments in light of the
fact that they did or did not have the services of a comptroller
—
not all commands rate or have such an officer assigned. It should
be noted at the outset, however, that no one is more
professionally involved with Project PRIME than the officer
assigned a billet as Comptroller. The following chapters are
written in light of this fact and the dictate that the subject
matter in a paper of this duration must in many regards be limited
in order to be adequately covered.
Research Question
As mentioned in previous paragraphs the performance of the
Middle Manager in the Marine Corps in the implementation of
Project PRIMA has been the subject of notable discussion and
comment by top managers in the Department of Defense. This paper
is an effort to investigate the performance of these managers as
it relates to the subject management systems in specific areas.
In this effort it will attempt to answer the following question.
"What is expected of the middle manager under the management
system known as Project PRIMA?" Closely allied to this question,
and essentially tied to it are the following considerations.
"Has the middle manager achieved what is expected of him?" If
ii
he has not, are there reasons attendant to this failure?" And,
"How can the performance of the middle manager best achieve its
full potential?"

9The obvious starting point in insuring that proper
distinctions are made is a consideration of the terms which
comprise the title of this research effort-- "Project PRIME" and
"Middle Manager." The fact that the existing versions of Project
PRIME cannot properly be attributed a definition acceptable to
all concerned creates an aspect of this ps.per which begets
academic inconsistency. The essential theme of the paper relates
the efforts of the middle manager in the Marine Corps in light
of the author's interpretation of Project PRIME. This definition
varies from that held by those occupying positions as top
managers who pass judgment on their efforts. The importance of
these distinctions gives rise to detailed descriptions and
therefore the chapter entitled "introduction" is atypical in
length.
The definitions which are termed essential are the
following:
Project PRIME : This term describes the management system
designed by Dr. R. K. Anthony while acting as Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller). The acronym PRIMS is derived from
PRlority Management Effort.
The dictates of this system will oe discussed at length
in chapters to follow, but it is necessary to recognize here
/
the
dual aspect of this original version of Project PRIME. Dr.
Anthony intended that this system provide management information
for decisions made by top management. This information was to be
of specific content collected and presented in prescribed format.
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The other side of this coin had to do with its use by managers
at all levels. A.s will be discussed, he repeatedly referred to
his intention to maice the system applicable as a management tool
by all managers under the direction of the Department of Defense.
Pro.lect PRLA^ Revised : The system to which this term
relates is that which resulted from the revisions made prior to
and during the test periods which were conducted by the various
services. The essential revision of this system was that which
excluded the application of the system to those organizations
directly related to combat and generally referred to in the
Marine Corps as Fleet Marine Force Organizations. Its
significance is as large as the fact that these units employ over
one half of the resources consumed by the Marine Corps.
PRIME) '69 : This version of the original system was still
a further diluting of the original concept. The major distinction
is that it incorporated a more definitive or purified version of
the accounting Involved.
PRIME '70 : The exact version of this system is
conjecture since it is still undergoing review. There are
indications it will follow the trend established in the preceding
revisions, and that these might be the most drastic to date.
Middle Manager : Compounding the confusion the writer
encountered in research was the definition of the second of the
terms included in the title of this paper. Consequently, it is
necessary to make similar distinctions in defining this term.




Middle Manager— Pro.lect PRIME : Officers assigned billets
as middle managers are, with the exceptions to be noted, holders
of the grades of major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel. There
is a relationship between rank and position on the military
managerial ladder.
The second factor which must be considered in identifying
middle managers is the duty assignment of tne individual. In this
regard it is possiole to describe situations in which a second
lieutenant occupies a position wherein he makes significant
managerial decisions wnile the particular assignment of one
holding the rank of colonel is totally divorced from any such
considerations. They are too few to merit more than passing
acknowledgment. Generally, there is a hazy area between various
officers of the rank of major and colonel concerning their being
categorized as low or middle managers, and middle or top
managers, respectively. The essential consideration, then, is
the decisions with which the individual is concerned, although
the expected correlation of rank and type of decisions once again
is evident.
^The classification of managers as described herein is
not published officially but is concurred with by officers
assigned billets directly related to Project PRIME at Headquarters
Marine Corps. These officers include: Lt. Col. T. P. Redfield,
Major Mark moveless and Colonel K. P. Sturdevan.
2 in the version of the system referred to as Project PRI
the term botton (or lower) manager is not specifically addressed.
There are several reasons, the most important of which is the fact
that these managers are normally officers of the first three
grades—second lieutenant, first lieutenant, and captain. Their
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The third consideration is one which deals with
quantitative factors. There are few occasions in the managerial
world wherein the most important decisions are not those which
deal with the greater values, usually expressed in numbers of
dollars involved. This truism carries over to military
managerial activities, but requires amplification. There are a
number of managerial positions in the Marine Corps which, tnough
not directly dealing in l:..rge transactions of monetary value,
must be considered as middle or even top managerial positions.
Such exceptions ordinarily encompass those individuals holding
designations which are concerned with the administrative aspects
of management. «n example is the officer assigned the position
of Fiscal Director of the I-larine Corps. Despite the fact that
he is not directly responsible for the disbursement of significant
sums of money he occupies a vital position as a top manager in
the Marine Corps.
middle Manager— Pii-Mai xievlsed : Generally the determinants
described above hold true for those subscribing to this definition
of Project PRIMJ5. There is, however, in this revision a movement
down the managerial ladder dependent on assignment to Fleet
Marine Force commands. An example is the determination that
duties do not involve the authority to make manager ictl decisions
of significance even in the original version of Project PKI
The preponderance of their contributions take the form of
Information provided for use in decision making at the next level
of management— the middle manager.
^-The description of the duties to be performed by the




detailed mechanics of accrual accounting will not be required of
combat organizations and other specified organizational units.
As a result, various positions on the managerial ladder would be
rearranged. itor example, numerous majors would become bottom
or lower managers, and a comparable number of colonels would be
considered as middle managers instead of top managers.
Middle Manager—PRIMS '69 : The categorization of these
managers is comparably simple. Under the revisions of this
version of Project PRIMS those officers receiving Operations
Budgets are considered middle managers. Those officers who
administer operating funds or sub-allotments under these budgets
are lower or bottom managers. Those responsible for administering
the monies of a "Major Claimant" occupy positions of top
management. The Headquarters of the United States Marine Oorps
is the sole major claimant.
Sources of Information
As previously mentioned, the reference material available
in the area of Resources Management in the Department of Defense
is largely concerned with the systems at the level of top
managers. As previously discussed, aside from the applicable
Marine Corps orders and Department of Defense directives, little
has been written on the subject of Project PRIMS relative to the
mechanics of application. As a result the writer had to rely on
"Marine Corps Order P7000.3, paragraph 16.
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Interviews with managers who have been exposed to this facet of
the system. This approach was less than ideal for several reasons
The first was the fact that a lack of propinquity precluded
contact with a larger number of the managers occupying these
billets. The second was the hesitation on the part of the
managers interviewed to give permission for direct quotation.
(However, as a result of these interviews, the writer approaches
the subject with a new perspective.) The writer interviewed a
total of 31 officers who occupied or had occupied middle
managerial positions in the Marine Corps. Most were involved in
PRIMS Revised. At each such interview a questionnaire, attached
as Appendix A, was completed. The totals indicate the number of
managers so answering the questions on the format. Whenever
possible the conclusions drawn from these questions were
substantiated by direct quotations.
For obvious reasons the managers interviewed were located
at Marine Bases on the iast Coast of the United States.
Investigation of reports and interviews at Headquarters United
States Marine Corps indicates that there is no significant
difference between the problems and performance of middle
managers in this area and like managers in other locales.
•^The reports referenced include Monthly Performance
Reports and related materials. Officers concurring in this
judgment include the Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps, Mr.
James Wright, Lieutenant Colonel J. F. Redfield, and Major Mark




In addition, seven officers in related areas stationed
at Headquarters Marine Corps were interviewed, and quotations
therefrom are used to substantiate the results of the
questionnaire whenever possible.
The Office of Evaluation and Review, Fiscal Division,
Headquarters United States Marine Corps made available to the
writer volumes of reports and correspondence dating from the
initial days of Project PR IMS until the present time. These
reports and related correspondence will also be employed relative
to the conclusions drawn from the opinions expressed by the
middle managers Interviewed.
The subject matter of this paper necessitates that it deal
with specifics and practical application as opposed to the
conceptual and general aspects of PRIME as a management system.
The writer acknowledges the requirement that one must be at least
conversant with the basic concepts which relate to these
particulars if the full impact of the administration of PRIMB is
to be appreciated. The subsequent chapters which deal with the
conceptual derivations of Project PRIME are not intended to be
exhaustive, nor could they be in a paper of this duration. The
reader is referred to the applicable entries In the bibliography
for a deeper consideration of these principles.

CHAPT3R II
I$*£KS£ MAMAG&'LiKT SYSTEMS UB THE
$SIJEfcA,L GOViRM^fcT
The complexities involved in Defense decision making today
stand in dramatic juxtaposition to the comparable efforts of the
earliest of military managers although the essential consider-
ations are the same. The leaders of the first organized units
had to recruit, train and equip their fighting forces and maintain
them in a combat ready status. Managerial efforts may have
consisted of issuing an extra spear or spare bow string, yet it
required management information—what to buy; how many; and when.
As man became more civilized his means for waging war became less
civilized—and more complicated. With each advancement in the
state of the art, additional resources had to be spent in
equipping a military force, and the costs involved increased
proportionately. Eventually, it became impossible for the lord
of the manor to summon his vassals and lead them into battle.
Man to man encounters gave way to employment of machinery and the





The advent of gunpowder made the waging of war doubly
involved when firepower became equally important as manpower.
The ultimate result was that the ability to wage war was
essentially tied to the ability to produce the means by which the
war was to be fought. A second consequence was that the costs
involved soon exceeded the ability of private parties to finance
armies. The expense was so enormous that it was within the
reach solely of governments, and often the poorer nations were
unable to finance the combat forces they desired.
The principle of mass armies in combat required the
entry of private industry into the waging of war. Governments
found that although they were able to raise sufficient money to
finance the forces they desired, they were unable to provide
the stores necessary from their own stocks and manufacturing
plants. The letting of contracts to produce war materials was
the beginning of the gigantic industrial complex which today
concerns itself with the production of weapons systems and
related materials. The United States of America is a late
entry in the history of financing and managing armies and related
weapons, but even her short history recalls several efforts in
this regard. The following account of the major efforts in the
areas of government budgeting, disbursement and accounting is a
'•Richard A. Preston, Men in Arms (Kew York: Frederick A.






logical stepping stone to a discussion of Defense management
systems as they exist today.
Legislation Involving federal Management
The history of every nation lists various phases of its
activities whereunder it collected, disbursed and accounted for
money. History is replete with accounts of the extreme tactics
employed by governments in order to exact taxes from the people.
in general, there never seemed to be enough money in government
treasuries to finance its expenditures. The original problems
facing the United States as a nation were therefore unique.
During the years following 1789 the government had quite
another problem—how to legally expend the surpluses which
accumulated in the Treasury. The Federal Government was small
and her revenues from customs and tariffs far exceeded her
expenditures.^
This rather pleasant task was eroded by the War of 1312
when the government experienced a considerable deficit in
spending. The era of federal surplus ended abruptly and was
never to return again for any length of time. Of the sixteen
fiscal years between 1894 and 1909, ten were years in which a
2
deficit was incurred. With the advent of increased expenditures
^•Ott and Ott, Federal Budget Policy (Washington, D. C. :
The Brookings institution, 1965), p. 5.
2jesse Burkhead, Governmental Budgeting (ftew lork : John
Wiley 3c Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 11.
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by enlarged government activities and the existence of the
deficit, attention was directed to the manner in which the
government expended and accounted for its funds. In 1910,
President Taft appointed a Commission on Economy and Efficiency
in Government. 1 The purpose of this Commission was to examine
the fiscal and financial operations of the Federal Government and
make recommendations to Congress concerning their improvement.
The report was delivered two years later and one of the major
recommendations made was the establishment of an entirely
different form of Federal budget. 2 These recommendations included
more specific dictates as to how the budget was to be organized
and executed. it was to be a comprehensive executive budget
which would be classified by program or function and would
distinguish between expenditures for capital acquisition and for
currently expended items.
^
In subsequent paragraphs mention will be made of these
same recommendations in connection with the establishment of the
budgetary procedures called for under the existing Resources
I4anageraent Systems in the Department of Defense. This is one
indication of the extreme deliberation with which the Congress
1 lbid.
, p. 213.
20tt and Ott, Federal Budget Policy , p. 5.
3Arthur Smithies, "Conceptual framework: for the Program
Budget," Program Budgeting. Program Analysis and the Federal
Budget , edited by David Kovick ('washing ton, d". 571 Government
Printing Office, 1965), p. 7.
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enacts such proposals. It is not widely publicized that many of
the enactments which are associated with the Management
Revolution of the 1960's were actually recommended over 50 years
previously. in this regard Aaron Wlldavsky, in his earthy
appraisal of the traditional hesitancy to change exhibited by
the Congress, said:
The tradition of reform in America is a noble one,
not easily denied. But in the matter of Congress and
Budgetary procedures it is better to identify your
proposal (for change) as a revision, or amplification
of present policy. These terms seem not to carry with
them the quality which dooms most proposals calling
for changes in a system with which they ^Congress/
are fully acquainted. 1
Subsequent to World War i efforts at Improving management
in the government resumed. The passage of the Budgeting and
accounting Act in 1921 was a major step toward more efficient
management in the federal Government. It implemented many of the
recommendations made by the commission appointed by President
Taft, the most important of which dealt with the formulation and
execution of the budget. It required the President to submit a
comprehensive budget proposal for review by the Congress, and set
up the Bureau of the Budget to assist him in this regard.
aaron wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 131-32.
pSmithies, "Conceptual Framework," p. 9.
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However, the form of the budget remained the same. The entire
uudgetary cycle concerned itself with the objects of the
expenditures. Jiven this improvement failed to direct the
attention of budget proposals to the program for which the money
was being expended, or the function with which it was concerned.
it was still impossible to determine the magnitude of government
exoenditures for a given program or end mission because the money
had been appropriated under numerous (often hundreds) of
appropriations for specific items which were not tied to the
programs under which they were to be expended. Program Budgeting
remained in limbo.
The next major effort at reform in government financial
procedures was made by the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government. This commission, appointed
by President Truman, is popularly referred to as the First hoover
Commission and will be so called in this paper. The First Hoover
Commission found that,
. . . the budget document itself, because of its
size and complexity and its concentration on services
and materials to be bought rather than programs to
be undertaken, is a relatively ineffective tool of
management.
2
1 Ibld., p. 133.
SJi S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Concluding Report (Washington, D. C. : The
Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 13.
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in order to produce a budget document which would be more useful
to both the President and Congress, the First Hoover Commission
recommended that "the budget document be completely recast along
the lines of work programs and functions. Such a document we
designate as a 'performance budget' . . . ."
performance budget is defined as,
. . .
one which presents the purposes and objectives
for which funds are required, the costs of the
programs proposed for achieving these objectives and
the quantitative data measuring the accomplishments
and work performed under each program.
2
In keeping with the aforementioned characteristics the Congress
did not enact legislation as recommended by the First Hoover
Commission and the budgeting procedure continued on as of old.
There were, however, certain procedures which were included in
the Budgeting and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 which laid
the foundation for much of the advancement which was to take
place during the next fifteen years. These will be discussed in
detail in subsequent paragraphs.
Second Hoover Commission in 1955 expanded upon the
efforts of the original body. It recommended a "program budget"
of even more specific confines than the performance budget to
which reference was previously made. This proposal sought
improvements in the government accounting system. The system
J- Ibld .
2 3urkhead, Government Budgeting , p. 133.
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proposed would enable future budgeting to be made on a cost
basis and oriented toward results rather than procurements
.
As in the concept forwarded by the original Hoover Commission,
the budget would be based on performance or end results. The
Commission further recommended that Government accounting be done
on a cost accrual basis so as to provide such management
information as would enable the President and Congress to equate
resources expended and results achieved. Finally, in 1956, a
close version of these proposals was enacted into law.^
The purpose of the preceding paragraphs was to present
the development of certain managerial processes in the Federal
Government. These processes directly relate to a discussion of
the Resources Management Systems which are presently in effect
in the Department of Defense, and, therefore, to Project PRIME
as it exists in the United States Marine Corps.
wever, before commencing an investigation of these
systems one additional facet must be presented. Paralleling the
development of management techniques in the government was a
similar development in the Department of Defense. The following
paragraphs are devoted to those legislative enactments, executive
-^Smithies, "Conceptual Framework, " p. 8.
^public ijaw 363 called for an accrual based accounting
in all government departments. However, on December 1, 1968,
only 37 per cent of government agencies had complied. A full
statistical breakdown of these is listed in the lecture notes of
Dr. Karl Stromsen, School of Government and Business, The George
Washington University, Washington, D. C.
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directives and related procedures which created the environment
in the Department of Defense prior to the arrival of Robert 3.
McNaraara and the initial efforts toward Resources iiana&ement
Systems as they exist today.

CHAPTER III
>t,U¥lDH OF MABA6BMBFT 3Y3T3M3 IN THE
DiSPARTxlriNT OF DSFi-)NS3
background History
Since 1789, the direction of the Armed forces of the
United States has been vested in one man--the President.
According to Article li f Section 2, of the United States
Constitution, he is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.
The advent of gigantic armed forces and the capability to
virtually destroy entire nations has not altered this basic
fact--The President is personally responsible for the employment
of the Armed Forces of this nation.
What has taken place, however, is a drastic change in
the organizational pattern of support for the President in the
execution of these responsibilities. Initially, a single deputy,
the Secretary of war, was his sole assistant.-'- In 1798, naval
activities assumed new importance as a result of the engagements
Paul I. Rannond, Organizing for uefense: The American
Military Establishment in The Twentieth Century (Princeton. FT J.





attendant to the Barbary Coast, and the Department of the Navy
was established. 1 During the next 150 years the President
constituted the sole court for settling disputes between the two
military departments. This arrangement remained in effect until
the creation of the Office of Secretary of Defense in accordance
with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. 2
During most of the ensuing period there was little difficulty in
arbitrating disputes since the dividing line was quite clear.
What had to do with the water was properly a concern of the Navy,
and all else belonged in the domain of the Army.
The simple logic of this proposition was inexorably eroded
by the developments which accompanied the increasingly complicated
business of preparing for and waging war. During the initial
stages of this period the size of the Army never reached beyond
18,000 and the Navy 13,000— the Import of which would attract only
passing attention. ^ However, with the conclusion of every
confrontation involving the use of the Armed Forces, proposals
were forwarded in hopes of achieving a closer coordination between
the various services. Ultimately this would minimize the parochial
1 ibid., p. 29.
2National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th
Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 1947 {61 Stat. 495).
3c. - 3orklund, The Department of Defense (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 4.
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^elf seeking which was much in evidence during the recap of such
c ^deavors
.
rid War i brought to light some serious problems
regarding the waste of time, money and resources caused by
conflicting demands on the nation for war materials from
uncoordinated iirmy and Navy procurement officials. 2 Perhaps the
most celebrated of these debates was the one occasioned by the
court martial of Srigadier General William Mitchell. During the
testimony several noted military personnel gave conflicting
statements concerning the value of creating "a law establishing
three oranches of military services— land, sea and air—with one
individual, a Secretary of defense, responsible for all national
defense. ^ The debates which arose died a natural death, and the
military establishment continued in status quo until World <«ar IL,
9 in all previous conflicts, deficiencies in the
operation of the Armed forces were also Drought to light during
this war, and to an extent never before realized, however, the
end of this global war did not bring an era in which the calm of
peace time endeavors could silence the need for change. A new
term came to light. A new responsibility has been created. Tne
Gold War was declared.
Timothy i» . Stanley, American Defense and National
Security (Washington, D. G. : Public Affairs Press, 1965)
,
p. 43.
23orklund, The Department of Defense , p. 5.
3 lbid .. p. 19.
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The magnitude of the basics involved resulted In an
objective appraisal of the military establishment as it existed,
and the prospective which resulted recognized the military as
only one facet of the many sided considerations involving
economic growth, internal security, foreign policy and national
goals.
Protagonists were quick, to realize that the threat of
nuclear war demanded careful, coordinated and thorough planning
for preventive efforts and counter attack. Parochial
considerations, it was concluded, must of necessity be put aside.
Ajj one writer was to record, looking back on this period:
Heretofore, the tasks of the armed forces in
peacetime had been primarily to maintain cadres of
trained officers and men, to engage in mobilization
planning, develop prototypes of the weapons they
would like to order in quantity, and try to foresee
the circumstances and places in which they would be
called upon to fight. tiJach service had had a ^/Tlghting^
capability in being, especially the Navy; but these
forces were rarely expected to become involved in major
military operations until after America's friends had
been precipitated into war. Now all thi3 changed.
Contingency plans might have to be executed which
required a force of the magnitude never before known
in peacetime, and this might have to be done without
a period of grace for mobilization.!
Compounding the criticality of these considerations was
the advent of a technological revolution. The end of World War 11
brought with it the fruits of unprecedented research and the
1William Vi. Kaufmann, The ncNamara Strategy (New York:
Harper & Row, 1964), p. 5.
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potential for the greatest leap forward in the history of
empirical sciences. One who would be intimately involved in
the fruits of this expansion of scientific knowledge commented,
"... this explosive change has had no precedent in the 40,000
years of Homo Sapiens.'
These advancements in technology brought with them a
commensurate increase in the dollar cost associated with
implementing the potential they created. The staggering costs
involved in the assumption of the role thrust upon the United
States gave rise to repeated calls for economy and efficiency in
administering the funds attached thereto. It was in this
atmosphere that President Truman engaged in his controversial
efforts to unify the services as a measure to reduce costs and
increase efficiency. in addition to his concern with unification
as a measure to increase efficiency and reduce costs, President
Truman was concerned with establishing adequate controls over the
rapidly expanding military community. These efforts were
formalized under his leadership with the passage of the National
Security Act of 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947
This controversial legislative enactment established the
position of Secretary of Defense, and was a significant
^National Educational Association, The Technological
Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965),
p. 36.




development in the effort to Qrlng more effective and efficient
civilian control over the military. This act intended to bring
the three military departments of the ^rmy, fcavy (including Kaval
.tviatlon and the 1-larine Corps), and Air .Force under the general
direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. 2
The passage of this Act once again gave rise to fear of imminent
unification of the services on the part of those who vigorously
opposed it in the past. Although the debate had been dormant
for almost a decade many of the senior officers of the services
recalled that in 1932 a proposal for unification of the ^rued
rorces (at a purported savings of $100 million) was narrowly
defeated on the floor of the douse of Representatives.*
The heads of the various services were unanimously
opposed to unification and were aware that President Truman was
strongly in favor of such a move, as a result, the first
Secretary of Defense operated in an atmosphere of distrust on the
part of the military. For purposes of this paper, the most
significant aspect of this entire episode had to do with the
reasoning upon which President Truman based his conclusions.
The President believed that "we should integrate our strategic
plans, our budget and the military program." He proposed that
•^Borklund, The Department of Defense , p. 132.
National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th
Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 1947 (61 Stat. 495).




these concepts were all aspects of the same basic decisions.
It was toward this same end that much of the Resources Management
Systems instituted during the 1960's was oriented even though
the various services retained their identities.
The second aspect of this Act which relates to the
subject matter herein is the fact that a subsequent amendment
thereto provided for the establishment of an Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Comptroller. The military manager of today is well
acquainted with such names as Wilfred J. Mclleil, Charles J. Hitch,
and Robert N. Anthony who were to occupy this position
subsequently. Host of the detailed considerations of middle
managers today originated with these individuals.
Several developments during the next decade further
strengthened civilian authority over the military chiefs including
the reorganization of the military departments out of the chain
of command to the Commander in Chief. 2 The entire atmosphere
surrounding the military had changed.
There were only isolated instances of acceptance by the
military. General Maxwell D. Taylor supported a mission-oriented
budget as Chief of Staff of the Army. He stated that
ICharles J. Hitch, "Decision Making In the Department of
Defense, " from the H. Rowan Gaither Lectures in Systems Sciences
at the University of California, April 5-9, 1965, p. 18.
department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, P. L.
85-599, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., August 6, 1958 (72 Stat. 514).
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The only meaningful way to look at our Armed
Forces is to consider the functions of the various
services. It is no longer satisfactory to view
the mission of each service vertically. We must
view them horizontally as integrated forces. . . .
This is the way they will be employed in war time.
-
1-
However, this candor likened General Taylor to the voice in the
wilderness. The various services continued to compete for the
budget dollar, often duplicating efforts and crossing lines of
traditional missions. The confrontation of the Air Force and
the Navy over budgeting for service oriented weapons systems in
the celebrated "Admirals Revolt" resulted in congressional
hearings on the matter. 2 It became apparent during these
proceedings that the Jnited States could not accurately determine
what kind, or how much defense was being purchased with the
taxpayers' money. The inevitability of a system which would
eliminate this glaring deficiency loomed. It was in this climate
that Robert 3. McKamara began his efforts to establish a form of
scientific management in the Department of Defense.
-^Borklund, The Department of Defense , p. 133.
2Vincent Dows, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill: The
University of Worth Carolina Press, 1967), p. 213.

CHAPT3R IV
THii RiJSOURCiSS MAMGBMjSMT SIoT^lS OP
SSCRiSTARY McMMARA
Background
When asked by President Kennedy to accept the position
of Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara investigated three basic
areas prior to accepting the position. First, he determined the
general climate which then existed in the Pentagon. He found
that the programs calling for more efficient management initiated
by his predecessors were virtually dormant. He concluded,
however, that a conceptual framework around which he could rally
the support of senior military officers did exist. Secondly,
he investigated the potential Impact of the increase of authority
which had been granted to the Secretary of Defense by the
legislative enactments of the previous decade. He decided that
the authority to make the changes he anticipated theoretically
existed in the mandates provided by existing laws. Thirdly, he
asked himself the question: "Could I, or for that matter, could
anyone, truly manage the Department of Defense.'
^Robert S. McNamara, "Managing the Department of Defense,"




Among the first observations he made was that, although
the authority and the power afforded the Secretary of Defense
encompassed any decision he might be required to make, the manner
in which the decision was to be made was hazy. The duties were
clear, the authority ample, and the staff virtually complete, but
"little had been done to provide the tools whereby decisions
could be made.' Resources Management Systems in the Department
of Defense came into being to provide him with these tools, and
were to be so ordered as to provide the same facility to all
managers involved.
Mr. McNamara found that the complexities involved in
managing the Department of Defense were extensive enough to lend
credence to his query concerning the ability of anyone to
effectively control it. Nearly three million military personnel
fell under his Jurisdiction and the related support activities
involved the employment of over one million civilians. in
addition, his attention had to be directed to the nearly one
million reserve personnel. Managing a huge industrial concern
paled in light of these statistics and the fact that he would be
faced with the responsibility of administering a budget in excess
of #60 billion. 2 He realized that the significance of his
^ ibid
. . p. 4.
2 Time . February 3, 1963, p. 31. These figures do not
reflect the increases in both money and materials which
subsequently came under the direction of the Secretary of Defense
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decisions was to extend beyond the parochial considerations of
the Department of Defense. His decisions would affect the very-
economy of the nation. His judgments would have significant
implications on the peace of the entire world. The job was a
formidable challenge, even for one whose managerial talents were
unquestioned. He began his awesome task by initiating systems
which would provide him with the best possible information for
decision making.
When Mr. MclMamara arrived at the Pentagon in 1961, he
found that military planning and budgeting were being performed
independently. The responsibility for planning rested with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments. Requirements
were stated in terms of military forces and the weapons needed to
equip them. Budgeting, however, was done in terms of functional
categories such as military personnel, travel, and pensions.
•<ecause of the lack of coordination between military
planning and defense budgeting, excessive amounts were being
spent on like projects by two services simultaneously. m
addition, the funds expended for these projects could not be
determined in their totality. For example, an Air Force aircraft
wing was charged only with the costs of the aircraft and related
support equipment. Personnel, research and development costs,
"Daniel Seligman, "Mcfoamara's Management Revolution,"
Fortune . July, 1965.
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base support efforts, and the like were budgeted and paid for
separately. The same was true for a Navy aircraft wing. Total
associated costs were not known and therefore a comparison of the
two was impossible. There was a gap between the budgeting,
planning and accounting aspects of defense expenditures.
Mr. McKamara sought an alternate method. He desired to
expend funds in accordance with a total defense requirement. He
envisioned that the best possible defense for the nation could
be realized with a balanced posture of forces. To make these
determinations he had to know the total cost of the various
components comprising this posture. He initiated efforts toward
establishing a defense budget which would close the gap between
planning and budgeting and lay the foundation for scientific
decision making. An essential ingredient of this procedure would
include changes in the manner in which costs were accounted for
in the Defense Department. He stressed the importance of looking
at the Defense programs and their costs by mission, and insisted
on a consolidation of accounting information in a format which
would relate costs to missions or end results.
^
Mr. i4cNamara was solidly grounded in statistical methods
and economics when he assumed his duties. His previous use of
U. 3. Department of the Navy, Supply Department, The Navy
Programming Manual (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1965), p. 13.
2stephen jinke , Defense Management (Englewood Cliffs, JM. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 37.
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these and other quantified disciplines provided him with the
background he needed. The blueprint for the system he was to
adopt was already in existence in a book entitled, The Economics
of Defense in the ftuclear Age , by Charles J. Hitch and Roland
McKean. in this publication the authors gave detailed treatment
to the previously mentioned gap in management of the nation's
defense effort. They dealt at length with the proposition that
the information available to managers in the Department of
Defense was incompatible with the decisions which were to be
formulated based on this information. One of the authors, Mr.
Hitch, became the first Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller ) under Mr, ^ctoamara.
m keeping with his belief that defense decisions must
be made on the basis of a total overview of all the ramifications,
Mr . Hitch began efforts to coordinate a management system which




The first step was to put budget figures into categories
which were related to the things they would purchase--the end
products or missions. Viewing the budget would then give
information relative to the costs of the entire mission, and not
just the portion of it directly associated with the end product.
Both Mr. McWamara and Mr. Hitch were convinced that the financial
management system must provide the data needed Oy top defense
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management to make the crucial decisions involving the nation's
defense. In pursuit of purifying the information available they
employed a concept which was called ''programming. ul This concept
was to serve as a bridge in closing the gap between the military
planning process and the budgeting function.
This procedure gave recognition to the fact that the
great technical complexity of modern weapons systems, the lengthy
development and procurement time, devastating combat power and
enormous costs place a tremendous premium on the selection of
weapon systems for the future. Choices in these areas are the
key decisions around which the defense planning, programming and
budgeting were to be integrated into a complementary entity.
in order to make the best possible decisions the Secretary
of Defense must know the cost of each of the systems in relation
to its military effectiveness. These costs must, in turn, be
evaluated for a period longer than a single budget year. They
must include the initial investment but in addition must reflect
the annual operating costs associated in the years of its
operational life. The resulting procedures directly relate to
middle managers because they were subsequently to -account for
resources consumed in accordance with the categories selected
^Hitch, "Decision taking in the Department of Defense,"
p. 37.
^Charles J. Hitch, "The Defense Budget as a management
Tool." An address before the Annual Conference of the Armed
Forces Management Association, Washington, D. C, March 1, 1963.
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when this procedure was initiated.
A further aid in decision making was the establishment
of a I'"ive Year Defense Plan. This projection of requirements
was to act as a blue print for the future concerning defense
expenditures. it established for each service an anticipated
force structure for five years in the future. 1 Using these
program elements the decision maker would relate the requirement
of the estimated enemy threat to the costs involved over the
given future period. Planning and budgeting would be made in
accordance with the dictates of the information thusly derived.
Accounting for much of the dollars expended, for what program,
and for which element would befall the middle manager, for it
was he who would be given the responsibility for administering
many of the program sub-elements involved in this system. The
programs referred to above are as follows.
1. Strategic Forces . — Consists of strategic offensive,
strategic defensive and civil forces.
2. General Purpose Forces .—Consists of force oriented
program elements other than those in Program (Budget Activity) 1,
including the command organizations associated with those forces,
the logistics organizations organic to those forces, the related
logistics and support units which are deployed or deployable as
1
b'. 3., Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, The Navy Programming Manual (OPiSAV 90D-1, June,
1963), p. 1-3-1.
2 U. 3. Marine Corps, Test Directive for Marine Corps Test
of Project PRIMS, MC30 P7000.3 ^Quantico: Headquarters, Marine
Corps 3chool, 1963), pp. 5-6.

40
constituent parts of military or naval forces or field
organizations
.
3. Specialized Activities .— Consists of missions and
activities directly related to combat forces, but not a part of
any of the forces listed in Programs 1 and 2, on which
independent decisions can be made. includes resources for
primarily national or centrally directed Department of Defense
objectives for intelligence and security, and specialized missions
such as weather service, aerospace rescue/recovery and oceanog-
raphy.
4. Airlift and Seallft .— Consists of airlift, sealift
and other transportation organizations. Includes command logistic
support units organic to these organizations. Costs are net
after deduction of revenue from users.
5. Guard and Reserve Forces . Elements are arranged by
program (Strategic forces, General Purpose Forces, Specialized
/orces, Airlift and Sealift, Personnel Support and Administration)
in order to facilitate relating guard and reserve forces to the
active forces to which they would be attached if mobilized.
6. Research and Development . --Includes all research and
development activities which are not related to items which have
been approved for procurement and deployment. The cost of
research and development related to such items will appear in
appropriate elements in other programs.
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7. Logistics ."-Consists of supply and maintenance that
are not organic to other program elements. Includes not-
deployable supply depots and maintenance depots.
8. Personnel Support . --Consists of training, medical
and other activities associated with personnel, excluding training
specifically identified with another program element and
excluding housing, subsistence, medical, recreational and similar
costs that are organic to another element such as base operations.
9. Adminls tratlon . --Consists of resources for the
administrative support of departmental and major administrative
headquarters, field commands, and administrative activities (not
elsewhere accounted for), construction support activities, and
miscellaneous activities not accounted for elsewhere.
3ach of the preceding programs was so designed in order
to clearly distinguish at the major program level between (1)
activities directly related to defense posture, on which
independent decisions can be made, and (2) activities whose size
and resources are essentially dependent on the size and position
of the Independent activities. Programs 1 through 6 are
considered to be independent or force oriented programs. Programs
7, 8, and 9 are considered dependent programs. The majority of
the decisions in Program 6, Research and Development, will be
made in relation to the force oriented programs by virtue of the
inevitable relationship of the two on the majority of undertakings
in the field of research and development.
^• DJavy Programming Manual , p. 1-6-2.
.
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These major programs have been farther subdivided into
program elements which are the major building blocks of the
programs. A program element is both a description of a program
to be undertaken and a device for collecting costs. Program
elements are classified into two types--mission and service.
Mission program elements are charged with the cost of services
which are related and measurable and obtained from service units
in addition to the costs routinely and directly chargeable to the
mission. Service program elements reflect only those costs which
are not charged to mission elements as paying customers.
In light of these programs middle managers would account
for expenditures under only one of these programs relative to the




3. Maintenance of Material
4. Property Disposal
5. Medical Operations
6. Overseas Dependent Education
7. Personnel Support
8. Base Services
9. Operation of utilities
10. Maintenance and Repair of Real Property
11. Minor Construction
1 Ibid .. p. II-3-1.
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12. Other engineering Support
13. Administration
elements of expense
1. Military Personnel (at standard rates)
2. Military Trainees (at standard rates)
3. Military Unas signed (at standard rates)
4. Civilian Personnel
5. Travel of Personnel
6. Transportation of Things
7. Utilities and Hents
8. Communications
9. Purchased Equipment Maintenance (Department of
Defense)
10. Purchased Equipment Maintenance (Commercial)
11. Printing and Reproduction
12. Other Purchased Services
13. Aircraft, Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants
14. Ship Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants
15. Other Supplies
16. Equipment
Theoretically, managers are, as a result of these
classifications, able to participate more fully in decisions
because they have a measure of both inputs and outputs.
Consequently, the operating manager's experience should be more
expeditiously incorporated into the programming process. With the
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additional input now available the decisions which previously
were void this management information would acquire a new measure
of validity.
In the initial version of Project PRIMii the aforementioned
elements were to be administered by middle managers. Since the
totality of military outputs was in great measure a combination
of these elements, the significance of the middle manager is
prima facie.
These elements comprised the day-to-day operations
involving the men, equipment and related resources expended to
achieve a specified and measurable end result or mission. Since
each Department of Defense activity falls within one and only
one program element, the total of all the elements taken together
constitutes the total planned output of the Defense Department
for the period involved.
A further consideration prompted by the preceding
discussion involves the costing of subject elements. Since the
major program decisions are made in light of the program elements
involved, the programming system requires costing oy program
elements to insure the appropriate management information related
to these decisions. The middle manager accounts for his
considerable portion of the amounts involved by accruing them in
lj. 3., Department of Defense, POD Programming System .
Directive 7045.1, 1964, p. 2.

45
one of three categories--Operating Expenditures; Capital
Expenditures ; or Research and development. The vast majority of
the dollar cost involved is tied to the first of these categories,
and includes those items of equipment, payment and utilization of
manpower, and the balance of those resources funded through the
Operations and x-laintenance appropriations.
The essential dictates of the management system entitled
Project PRIMS call for the provision of management information
enabling decisions to oe made based on the planned costs and
budgeted amounts when compared to the end results achieved. This
ability is one which did not previously exist in any appreciable
2degree across the entire gamut of federal expenditures. Dr.
Anthony intended that the middle manager be intimately involved,
for it was he who would make many of the decisions concerning the
category to which considerable of these costs would be accrued.
Dilemmas which faced middle management will be given exemplary
representation subsequently. The managerial decisions which were
originally intended for the middle manager in the Marine Corps
were outlined under the initial dictates of Marine Corps Order
P7000.5 .
The preceding paragraphs have described the manner in
which information was to be provided top management to enable them
to improve on the decision making process. The process involved
-*-A detailed description of the accounting and disposition






in the decision making process includes such concepts as
"Operations Analysis" and "Systems Analysis." In a word, they
consist of a quantitative comparison of the benefits and costs
of various proposals, compared in light of the enemy threat they
oppose or a specific mission to be accomplished. The mechanics
of this decision malting process are highly technical in nature
and not germane to this paper.
We have thus far discussed how the information which is
utilized in the system is gathered and the format in which it is
presented. This facet is one with which middle management is
Intimately concerned. It is not the sole facet, however, for the
Hesources Management Systems instituted by Mr. McNamara is a
two-headed coin. The first side has been discussed; the second
side now presents itself for examination.
The Other oide of the Management System Coin
Mr. MciMamara was responsible for expanding existing
management systems to include the entire gamut of Planning,
Programming, and budgeting, as previously mentioned, there was a
dual aspect of the system since it concerned itself not only with
the decision making process, but also with the manner in which
managers were to perform their duties. This was the second side
of the coin. Thus far, this paper has addressed the major issues
involved. These issues center around one basic goal--a more
effective decision making process. This objective includes a
wide range of considerations, including the format of the
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information utilized by top management, the accounting procedures
employed, the criteria utilized, the quantification of previously
undefined missions, and various other policies incumbent on a
scientific management system. The systems discussed so far were
described in broad conceptual terminology and the mechanics
involved were not addressed. The Resources Management Systems,
as discussed thus far are the strategy. They are the ideas and
directions through which top management will obtain the required
information for decision making. It is, as the title describes,
a system, or a total overview of the entire area of management
and decision making at the highest level.
In addition to being a total management information
system the authors of these endeavors intended that the Resources
Management Systems in the Department of Defense be an entity
serving another and equally important goal. This end was much
more tangible and its goals far less lofty. The Resources
Management Systems in the Department of Defense were also Intended
as a management tool for managers of all levels. The President
of the United States made this clear when he said,
I want every manager to think of his part of the
total government in terms of everything he owns,
everything he owes and the full cost of doing every
job in relation to the products resulting from these
costs. I want him to think of minimal costs and
cost reduction as a profit from better management.
And I want him to think in terms of his profit as a
result of how he uses the resources entrusted to him.
Your full support is needed. 3very manager, both
general and financial alike must feel responsible for
providing the highest quality, business-type
information for this system. J-




The Assistant .Secretary of Defense ( Oomptro Her) during
this period made this side of the coin even more distinct when
he said,
Our purpose in undertaking this /management/
effort is not merely to comply with executive
requirements. Our interest is in the manager, in
enabling him and motivating nim to do the best, tne
most effective and the most efficient job of which
he is capable. It is also our purpose to provide the
manager with the tools to do such a job.J-
There now exists a new requirement. Procedures in force
had to be changed so as to conform with the oolicy guidance set
forth by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Mr-. Anthony
stated it this way:
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has
prescribed top management information requirements
the general principles, the definitions and the
uniform practices that are necessary for over-all
consistency. dlach Service and Agency will develop
a system that both conforms to these principles and
also meets its own management needs. in the United
States Lavy and Marine Oorps this effort is called
Project PRIMff. 2
Robert N. ^nthony, from a speech delivered to the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. G. printed
in Armed Forces management . June, 1966.
2Robert N. Anthony, The Armed Forces Controller




PROJECT PRIME IK THUJ AREHA OP MIDDLE MANAGERS
general
The Marine officer of today must exhibit talents in
addition to those expected of his predecessors. The leadership
qualities, esprit and devotion which have been traditional
amongst Marines for almost 200 years are no less important now;
but an effective Commander must now. acquire an additional
attribute--he must be an efficient manager. It is true that
Commanders of the past were responsible for the financial
operations of their units, but this function normally encompassed
the management of an allotted amount so as not to overspend.
This managerial skill no longer suffices. The Commandant of the
Marine Corps is specific about this point:
The Marine Corps has developed a philosophy of
financial management upon the principle that financial
management is inherent in command. This merely
extends that basic military axiom that a commander is
responsible for everythingand everybody in his
organization.
. . . But ^new7 systems of management
require that commanders acquire additional managerial
skills.
1
J. 3, Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order P7000.9B,





To assist the commander in financial management the
Marine Corps has established at Headquarters Marine Corps and its
larger commands a general staff financial organization to act as
the principal financial advisor to the commander. In addition,
selected officers are sent to postgraduate training in financial
management. in keeping with the policy of educating managers,
however, these officers are not restricted to assignment as
comptrollers. Officers having postgraduate training in the area
of financial management will fill on a rotational basis certain
of the billets in the Marine Oorps which have been designated as
rating a graduate of the Financial Management Course. However,
these assignments are rotated so as to provide as many prospective
commanders as possible with a solid background in the field of
financial management.^
A second basic tenet in this philosophy is that it is
the responsibility of every Marine to insure the most economical
utilization of available resources. in this regard the Marine
Corps looks upon Project PRIM3 as an additional tool by which
this goal can be achieved.
3
1 Ibld., p. 2.
2 U. 3. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order P7000.93,
A Financial Guidebook for Commanders , p. 18.
^General Wallace M. Greene, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, in an address to the students of Staff and Command College,
Quantico, Virginia, April 24, 1965.
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Project BRLflti as Initially Proposed
The writer has referred to the original version of
Project PRIME as proposed by Dr. Anthony as including two sides
of the management coin. The initial aspect addressed the need
for accurate information in proper format for decisions which
were to be made by top management. The second had to do with a
provision which would, hand in hand with the above consideration,
provide a management system by which managers of all levels could
better perform their duties. In order to create the proper
perspective a discussion of the first version of Project PRIME is
imperative as it was initially proposed during 1965. in the
subsequent months a formal, although not detailed, proposal was
formulated in preparation for congressional review. The
provision of the required funds associated with the Installation
of the system was an essential consideration.
That assistant .Secretary Anthony intended this to be a
full management system is made quite clear from the following
quotations taken from his speeches and articles during the
aforementioned timeframe.
Our purpose in undertaking this ^management/
system is not merely to comply with executive
requirement. Our interest is the manager, in enablin;
-^The Honorable ... Brewster Kopp, Assistant Secretary of
the army (Financial Management) said in an article published in
the April issue, 1966 of The Armed Forces Comptroller . "In
Octooer, 1965, Dr. Anthony, by memorandum to Secretary ticNamara
responded to the Secretary's request to outline a concept for
Resource Management to be in business by July, 1967."
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him and motivating him to do the best, the most
effective, and the most efficient job of which he is
capable. it is also our purpose to provide the manager
with the tools to do just such a job. 1
It is our goal to charge each organizational unit
with 1QQ.Z of the measurable expense that it incurs.
... as 1 said in the beginning, the purpose of
ever/ management system is to aid the manager. 2
• accounting was to be done down to the lowest practical
level. This premise of the original system has never been
totally employed in the Marine Corps. The specific problems
encountered in the incorporation of the required accounting
systems will be treated in detail in the chapter entitled
Conclusions and Recommendations. Basically, all accounting was to
be on a cost accrual basis. Under this concept revenues and
expenses are identified with specific periods of time, such as
four quarters during an accounting year, and are recorded as
incurred without regard to date of payment. Under this system
operating costs are accounted for in the period during which
benefits are received. The costs of such benefits received which
are applicable to future periods are deferred and considered as
assets
.
The first opposition to this system came during the
Congressional hearings of the House Committee on Military
Appropriations during June of 1967. It was the opinion of the
-"Robert V. Anthony, speech delivered to the industrial
College of the Armed Forces, Washington, :o. C, printed in the




Committee that the system called for "too mucn too soon."
Although this doomed the full scale implementation of Project
PRIME for fiscal year 1968, it did not totally negate the overall
effort. The Committee directed that no change be made in the
Department of Defense budgeting and accounting system prior to
the formulation of Fiscal lear 1969 budget presentation. It
did not approve the funds for the implementation of Project PRIME
2
as requested by Secretary Mcfoamara. The Committee did,
however, state that there was to be a testing of Project PRIMB
at selected activities in each of the various services. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) directed that these
tests be planned and executed during Fiscal Year 1968. The test
in the united States Marine Corps took place at the Marine Corps
Base, Quantico, Virginia.
TestlnK tne Original Version of
Project PRIME
The Marine Corps test of Project PRIME began October 1,
1967. The test was conducted under normal staff and command
structure (although there was augmentation thereto) in order to
simulate conditions when PRIME was ultimately made effective in
U, 3. Congress. Department of Defense Appropriations






the field. The objective of this test was listed in the
2
authorizing directive:
1. To evaluate the practicality of margin
resources currently in the operations and military
personnel appropriations.
2. To evaluate the parallel structuring of
programing, budgeting and accounts
3. To analyze the ability of the system to
provide managers at all levels with information that
will help them insure resources are obtained and
effectively and efficiently utilized in the
accomplishment of the missions of the test.
4. To ascertain that the system provides a means
of assuring that statute agreements and other require-
ments emanating from higher authority relating to the
resources are complied with.
5. To evaluate the cost of Implementing the
system at the test site in relation to the benefits
realized.
6. To assess the impact of test results in
relation to Marine Corps wide adoption of the concept.
7. To identify and recommend improvements or
modifications to the concept of the systems involved
in the test.
During the test period costs were to be accounted for in
accordance with the original concept proposed ay Mr. Anthony.
It is noted that because of the nature of the functions conducted
at ^uantico (operation of Marine professional schools and training
facilities) titles of the test elements and sub-elements did not
include combat organizations (regiment, battalion). However,
the comparable units at the test site "were designated as
belonging to a given program, program element, functional category
1U. S. Marine Corps, Order P7000.3, Test Directive for
Marine Corps Test of Project PB1M3 (^uantico, Virginia:
Headquarters Marine Corps School, 1967), p. 1.
2 Ibid ., p. 3.
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and element of expense." The reader should note this as one of
the essential differences brought to light in discussing
variances in the promulgation of what Project - is today.
it should be further noted that the appraisal of middle
manager under Project Pi in its original form, is restricted
to the performance of those who occupied these positions during
the test period at Marine Base, ^uantico, Virginia. This is a
distinction that is paramount in judging the appraisals made by
top management in the ensuing period. Under this concept of
Project PRIME applicable definitions are as listed on pages 9-13
of this paper.
Middle managers, it is noted, are of comparably junior
ranks. Judgments rendered under this concept regarded middle
managers as a "sine qua non" because the middle manager was to
administer sub-elements, the total of which comprised a
significant portion of the resources consumed.
Essential to . . . Project PRIME is the use of
expense elements. Each expense is identified to a
functional category, sub-functional category, cost
center, and sub-cost center ^which makes possible/
the capability of assigning cost down to the lowest
practical level.
An officer in charge of such a sub-division can be considered a
middle manager under the original version of Project PB -
Under subsequent versions of this system distinctions must be made.
1 Ibid., p. 16.




The initial period devoted to testing Project PRIMS was
actually a period of transition to a new version of the original
concept. The changes made to the initial proposal had more to do
with "whom" as opposed to "what". The significance of this
evolution was that it was negative in nature. The subsequent
versions of this management system were not a fuller more polished
version of the original, but more properly were a devolution—an
eroding of certain aspects of the original product. The portions
of the original concept which were continued resulted in a
management system entitled Project PRIMB: Revised.
Under the dictates of Project PRIiiS: Revised a
discrepancy arises concerning the definition of middle manager as
discussed in the preceding paragraphs regarding the original
version of PRIMS and its testing period. When top management uses
the term "Middle Manager" one must know the version of the system
upon which the title is predicated. Depending ur>on the intent of
the author one can attribute the term to individuals as
distinguishable as are the ranks of Captain and Major General.
If one predicates the term in accordance with the original
version of Project PRIMS then he might logically predicate it of
those officers who are administering Marine Barracks with
approximately fifty personnel assigned. If one refers to the
?leet Marine Forces which adjudicate Operating 3udgets (in
accordance with Project PRIMS: Revised) at installation level,
then one might properly refer to the Commander of such a base as
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a middle manager. Such an officer is normally of flag rank.
A clarification of the term "Middle Manager" in the Marine Corps
becomes evident once again.
Further enhancing a claim that this distinction is
necessary is a passage from the Guidebook for Oommanders
(regarding financial management), published by Headquarters
Marine Oorps in February, 1969. On page 8 of this document under
the definition of "Program .Elements," the examples of such an
element Include that of an Infantry Battalion. Fleet Marine
Force units are now excluded from Project PRIMS as program
elements.
The instructional outline for the Financial Management
Course at the Staff and Command College at the Marine Schools,
^uantico, Virginia utilizes a similar example which is to a like
degree confusing to those who will subsequently assume command in
the Fleet Marine Force. The sharp distinction which exists
between officers of middle management rank who are assigned to
combat oriented units and those assigned to non-Fleet Marine
Force units, such as Marine Barracks, is not clearly made in
accordance with the lesson plans used in the instructional periods
covering Project PRIMS.
Delineating a definition covering each of these positions
relative to the middle manager is not as important as insuring
that the reader recognizes the discrepancy. It is imperative
that this distinction be made during the balance of this paper,
and the writer will often refer to such distinctions.
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h Traditional Management Tool Replaced
Most middle managers in the Marine Corps first felt the
effect of Project PRIM2 when one of the venerable management
practices with which they were familiar gave way to the new
systems. This management tool was the use of a daily updated
balance sheet by which each commander was able to judge his
financial status in light of funds obligated and remaining. A
detailed description of this managerial practice will be presented
subsequently; however, it is mentioned here as it relates to the
initial impact of Project PRIMi; on the middle manager.
Prior to Project PRIMiS and the Operating Budget concept,
Congress appropriated a given amount of money for operation of the
Marine Corps. in turn, the Marine Corps would authorize each of
its major components to spend a given portion of this money
through an allotment. 1 The obligation and expenditure of these
funds, by law, may not exceed the amount specified on the
allotment, and the purpose for which the authorization is made
o
must be adhered to.
Allotments are now granted to commanders for operations
by means of Operating Budgets. It is noted here again that prior
1-An appropriation refers to an amount of money which is
authorized by an act of Congress to be used for purposes
designated therein. it is the formal permission from the federal
Government to authorize payments from the Treasury for specified
purposes. Middle managers are in no way directly involved in
congressional appropriations.
An allotment is a further subdivision of an appropriation,
and is extended to organizations below the level of those
receiving appropriations.
2 J. 3., .Department of Defense, Instruction 7301. 56A,




to the installation of Project PRIMn), virtually the entire field
of accounting for middle managers consisted of insuring that an
over expenditure did not occur. iSach commander kept a daily
running total of the balance of unobligated funds. He was
expected to maintain a proportionate amount in light of the time
remaining during the period in which the money was to be spent.
He was not, for example, to expend 75 per cent of his allotment
during the first quarter of the applicable period.
The new concept differs in that specified amounts are
still allotted for each of the periods during the fiscal year,
but are further subdivided into the amounts to be spent for
various suo-categories during the period. In other words, most
commanders must now account for more than simple total dollars
spent and total dollars remaining, and account by accrued
expenditures for each of the specified sub-categories. Appendix
B Indicates the various sub-categories and periods involved.
The problems encountered in insuring the totality and accuracy
of this report are considerable.
Problem Areas Apropos of the Middle Manager
A related difficulty which was encountered by middle
managers was that which concerned accounting for military
personnel and the services which they rendered. Nineteen of the
officers interviewed indicated this as the most pressing source
of difficulty in their efforts to implement this management system
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Often after diligent planning they progressed along the normal
guidelines provided by their Operating Budget. The various
expense categories were in accordance with proportion guidelines
when the next reporting period began. However, during this
period the status of their organization changed drastically by
virtue of the number of personnel attached and, therefore, the
dollar amount to be charged for their services. The middle manager
had no control over the assignment of these individuals yet his
budget figures now showed that he would overspend during the
following accounting period. The entire budget had to be
reworked, and consequently was late in submission. 1
One of the categories required accounting for expenses
according to the accrued cost procedure involves costs for
services received. Middle managers have found it difficult to
complete required paper work in this regard because of the delay
in receiving accounting documents from the support organization
rendering the service. Conversely, most middle managers
interviewed stated that they were unable to render expeditious
service in returning the required data because they were short of
personnel in the critical fields of accounting and administration.
The vast majority of these middle managers indicated that this
Isee Appendix A. Of the 31 middle managers interviewed,
25 indicated that the biggest problem area they encountered was
in the field of accounting for military personnel. This
particular comment lacks credulity in one regard since provisions
are made by higher commands for such overages.
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shortage was prompted by the increased administrative workload
occasioned by requirements under procedures attendant to Project
PR I.
Because of the vicissitudes resulting from the previous
considerations the managerial information available to the middle
manager is not as timely as it was under the previous system.
As one former Commander stated,
PRIME has the potential for providing the
commander with a wealth of valuable information.
dOv/ever, this information is useless if it is
inaccurate or not up to date. Under the previous
system 1 knew on a daily basis how much money 1 had
spent and consequently how much I had remaining to
spend. Now 1 am never quite sure.l
Even prior to the initial efforts at testing this concept,
senior military officers had presented to Dr. Anthony a convincing
argument that at least at present it would be virtually impossible
to implement the full system of PRIME in combat organizations.
Mr. McNamara decided the program would exclude certain of the
operating forces of the Fleet Marine Force as total participants
in this aspect of Resources Management Systems.
The validity of this contention and the resultant
decision was further substantiated by the results of the test.
Personal interview with Lieutenant Colonel W. C. Service,
III regarding his experience as a Commander during the initial
implementation of Project PRIME in field organizations,
November 19, 1968.
^Rear Admiral iC. R. Wheeler, S.C., USB, in an address to




A significant workload was generated by
administrators at lower levels by Project PR 1MB
which required draining manpower from existing
areas ... to meet the new requirements. The
movement of these personnel reduced certain
functional areas to a status of "just getting by"
and limited the tasks that could be performed to
minimum essential requirements.!
The writer located no information indicating that any
subsequent attempt was made to implement the full concept in all
Fleet Marine Force organization. The task was diminished but
was still considerable. "PRIME Revised gave us some relief from
the original requirements but it is still a very ambitious and
demanding undertaking." 2
The exceptions alluded to previously concerning those
individuals assigned to combat units is readdressed. For such
personnel, each service is required to accumulate totals in
accordance with standard rates for the number of individuals on
hand in these organizations .5 The commander previously mentioned
must now request his increases in the common denominator—dollars
Many of the difficulties attendant to this phase of PRIMS have to
do with the assignment of personnel over which the responsible
manager has no control, as was previously referenced. Preceding
Report from the Commanding General, Marine Corps Base,
^uantico, Virginia to the Commandant of the Marine Corps; Result
of Testing Project Prime, February 27, 1969.
brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, JSMC, briefing given
to PRIME ..valuation Croup, Pentagon, Washington, D. C,
October 28, 1968.
p. 54.
5u. 3. Department of Defense, Project PRIMS Handbook .
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paragraphs discussed specific difficulties regarding middle
managers in this regard, but a far more significant aspect is
now addressed. One of the potential values this system offers
is that of trade-off, such as using civilian for military
personnel and vice versa. No such managerial decision can be
made under the constraints imposed by legislative and political
restrictions. The diminishing of Civil Service personnel employed
by a military installation is not a matter which is regarded
lightly by the individuals involved or the Representatives they
elected to Congress. In addition, "floors" and "ceilings" on
spendinj in specific regards negate any managerial decisions in
these areas, despite the fact that a more efficient utilization
of resources might result.
Constraints and limitations continue to restrict
the manager in optimizing his resources. The need
for restraints is recognized. However, continuing
effort should be exerted toward confining them to a
minimum. The envisioned goal of flexibility in ,
administering resources remains as yet to be realized.
Rear Admiral Wheeler, in the previously referenced
address said, "... Achieving the full potential of PRIMS is
predicated upon managers acting outside restraints. . . . These
restraints are for the most part still with us.
1Commanding General, Marine Corps Educational Command,
^uantico, Virginia, Project Prime Test Report, October 8, 1968,
p. 5.
2Rear Admiral K. R. Vvheeler, S.C., U3K, in an address to




Additional Expenses Accrue to Project PRIM.
Under the dictates of this management system, as proposed
by Dr. Anthony, nothing was to be free. Implementing the system
brought to light the fact that this included Project PRJJME itself.
although the initiating of any new system carries with it expenses
which exceed those required to keep it in being as a going
concern, managers have found that the system has created serious
problems regarding additional personnel required in its execution.
Regarding these shortages, Colonel G. K. Jturdevan said during a
meeting of the Project PRIMS Steering/Evaluation Group, "Most
managers are adjudicating a deficit in money and personnel, not
managing for the best use of the resources available." These
notions are of direct concern to the middle manager since it is
he who will cope with these shortages on a daily basis.
• • • lS)XX£j personnel status continues to be the
major impediment to a more aggressive implementation
of Project PRIME. Relating this to the presentations
made by the representatives here our problem ^eems
to be equivalent to that of all the services. 2
Those middle managers who fall under the
provisions of PRIME Revised have encountered
significant problems in the area of knowledgeable
subordinates. The areas in which specific
difficulties have been encountered include accounting,
administration and the increased workload imposed
upon the available personnel.
^
•^-Record of Minutes of Project Prime Steering/Evaluation
Group (Washington, D, C, 1969), p. 48. (mimeographed)
2Rear Admiral L. 3. McDonald, Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Fleet Representative, Record of Minutes of Project Prime Steering/
Evaluation Group, p. 47.
^Sturdevan, Record of Minutes of Project Prime Steering/
Evaluation Group, p. 49.
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The overall personnel situation is bleak . . .
and appears to be getting worse rather than better.
We have again restated our requirements for the
necessary /personnel/ augmentation to properly
implement and sustain the desired PRIMS accounting,
reporting, analyzing and budgeting. 1
Of significance to the intent of this paper is the fact
that existing personnel resources must, in accordance with command
priority, be diverted to the preparation of reports for higher
headquarters. A result of this is that middle managers are
primarily concerned with providing timely, accurate information
for top management and consequently only secondarily concerned
with the use of this information as a management tool for their
own use. These comments are made with full knowledge that a lack
of personnel has been a perennial complaint of the military.
However, relative to the subject at hand, the middle manager in
Project PRIME equates it differently— to a serious negation of the
second side of the management coin as Dr. Anthony viewed it.
Middle managers cannot achieve the full potential of this system
so long as they are understaffed. The significance of this fact
has not been overlooked by top management, albeit the fact they
are primarily concerned with the timely, accurate receipt of
management information.
However, equally important to these officers is the
welfare of the middle manager under this system. "My chief concern
is with the availability of resources ,/money and people/ to supply
and make effective use of the increased detail required by PRXMiS
McDonald, Record of Minutes of Project Prime Steering/
Evaluation Group, p. 49.
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systems. . . . There is a shortage of trained personnel and a
requirement for additional resources.'
Improvements Realized Under Project PR IAS
The nature of the discussion thus far has been
predominantly negative regarding the implementation of Project
PR I: The juxtaposition of the following comments will hopefully
insure the objectivity of this treatise. They are not added to
balance the presentation, but are equally valid deductions which
resulted from the research effort involved.
"Commanders have become more cost conscious since the
Inauguration of Project PRIME." 2 An elemental reason for this is
the required costing of military personnel. Prior to the
installation of this management system commanders dealt in two
different realms regarding costs. /.ere a commander to desire
additional resources he might, for example, state his requirements
as "400 more personnel and J)200,000." Distinction existed in his
mind between two different considerations--personnel and money.
This is no longer true, and the importance of this attribute was
recognized in the early stages of its development.
The most important single element of controllable
costs not now budgeted or accounted for by user units
is military personnel. in order to measure and makie
known the entire operating costs of a unit, procedures
are being devised which require user units,, to budget
and account for these important resources.
iCommandant of the Marine Corps, briefing to the Evaluation
Group of the Navy Department, Pentagon, October 27, 1968.
2Letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps from the
Commanding General, Marine Corps Educational Center, February 27,
1969.
3(J, 3., Department of Defense, A Primer on Project PRIME
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 51.
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All versions of Project PRIMS require that all personnel
providing services to a mission/organization will be charged
thereto. One of the more progressive aspects of PBIME has been
the development of a system whereunder these costs have been
simplified by virtue of the standardization of rates and the
purification of the elements to which they are charged. The
ultimate result is that military personnel are no longer "free"
to users and that every attached individual will be used by (or
at least charged to) an organization, and commanders are
consequently being more efficient in their use.
In addition, middle managers have increased their
efficiency concerning budget preparation and submission.
Question seven of Appendix A indicates that the preponderance of
managers interviewed cited this aspect of Project PRIME as one
by which they were aided and the one which they best understood.
As previously discussed, the monthly Operating Budget and
Expense Report is a management tool with which the middle manager
was indirectly associated in times past. It relates to the
allotment balance sheet historically used by managers as long as
money has been sub-allotted to them. The basic function of this
form remains the same—an up-to-date appraisal of money which is
to be spent during specific periods during the accounting cycle.
The difficulty associated with this form is that it is not the
sole manuscript which must be kept in this regard.
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Obviating this concern is the fact that Congress did not
approve the merging of the Operations and Maintenance and the
Military Personnel Appropriations. As a result, some middle
managers must account dually so as to provide the Information
top management must use during congressional hearings. The
workload Involved was listed on a report to the Commandant, u". 3,
Marine Corps made during the initial period of Project PRIME:
As a result of the collection of military
personnel cost to the cost account level in dual
format, 128 personnel of varying ranks expend nearly
600 hours per month in the performance of this
function in addition to their regularly assigned
duties ,1
This report further states that there was a qualitative aspect
to personnel problems as well.
In an effort to eliminate this deficiency the Marine
Corps is exerting a substantial effort to educate its managers
on every level. One attempt to resolve shortages of trained
military and civilian personnel is the distribution of The
Essentials of Accounting text to all general officers and a
further admonition that senior civilian staff members complete
required courses of self instruction. 2 Relative to middle
'Report from the Commanding General, Marine Corps Base,
Quantlco, Virginia to the Commandant of the U. 3. Marine Corps,
Result of Testing Project PRIMS, p. 4.
Sturdevan, Record of Minutes of Project Prime Steering/
Evaluation Group, p. 45. The writer brings the attention of the
reader to the fact that this reference relates to the previously
cited discrepancy concerning the syllabus and reference book
mentioned in the footnote. Further mention of this fact will be
made in the chapter entitled "Conclusions and Recommendations."
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management, the same source stated,
. . . The Marine Corps Commanders ' Financial
Management manual has been updated to include
current concepts and procedures of Project PRIMS.
A review of the Command and Staff College and the
Amphibious Warfare School curriculums is being
made to update the instructions on the concepts of
PRIMS for the academic year beginning in August,
1969. 1
The preceding paragraphs were intended to bring to light
some of the considerations which the writer believes are essential
in a valid appraisal of the efforts of middle managers in the
Marine Corps relative to Project PRI. . They are not exhaustive,
nor are they intended to be. Rather, they were presented as the
major results of research in an area which did not lend itself
easily to such an endeavor. These discussions, hopefully, have
shed some light on the area of middle management in the Marine
Corps and consequently give the reader some indication of the
reasoning on which the conclusions and recommendations listed
in the next chapter are based.




It is misleading to forward opinions under the title of
this chapter without listing certain qualifications concerning
their history and validity.
It must be pointed out that the most talented personnel
available in the Department of Defense have labored unceasingly
since the inauguration of Project PRIME to improve and make of
it a viable management system. The changes which they have
supervised have made lengthy strides toward that goal. The
validity of comments made in a paper of this nature pale in light
of the years of endeavor afforded by these obviously competent
individuals. There exist, however, certain qualities Inherent
in a work of this nature which lend it a quality not always found
in similar efforts, since it was written without policy guidance.
Secondly, the perspective with which the writer views the
subject matter is vastly different from that of the ultimate
decision maker. The writer stipulates that the "big picture"
is the sole perspective on which ultimate decisions must be based,
This does not totally negate these observations made from a far




practicality of an academically perfect theory often invalidates
the best intentions of its author. There is little authoritative
evidence which challenges the accuracy or theoretical applica-
bility of Project PfilUB as a management system. However, the
input of those concerned with its implementation in matters of
facts and figures has resulted in a vastly changed version of
this patently valid theory. Finally, the writer was able to
approach the subject matter without extensive prior knowledge or
experience, which might have slanted the conclusions reached in
this research effort. it is with an accented appreciation of the
initial observation made above that the writer lists below
certain of the conclusions he has drawn and recommendations
related thereto.
The attitudes and consequently the performance of middle
managers in the Marine Corps are adversely affected by conclusions
which they have drawn as a result of misleading information
regarding Project PRIMjS. The opinions expressed in Appendix A
Indicate that the managers interviewed were of the opinion that
the system would interfere with their efforts to create a command
which was as combat ready as they could possibly make it. Most
considered the managerial tool of Project PRHIE an imposition
that was neither needed nor desired. These managers should have
concluded that as commanders of such units, Project PRIMS is
actually of little significance to them. Their managerial efforts
are virtually the same as those which were required under the
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previous system whereunder they controlled expenditures as
dictated by an operating target of a specified amount of dollars.
The changes affecting them are primarily those of format since
Project PR IMS has generated different report forms via which
these managers relay the management information they must submit
to higher headquarters.
The writer is unable to accurately identify the reasons
for this misinterpretation on the part of middle management.
The i'larine Oorps Schools syllabus which will be taught to
students of middle managerial potential during the acadenic year
1969 is not at this time available but, as mentioned earlier,
it is being revised.
The original mandate that every organizational unit
should be charged 100 per cent of its measurable expenses appears
to be too lofty a goal in light of the intangible nature of the
missions assigned military organizations. The reality of this
premise is acknowledged in the revisions thus far made to the
original concept of Project PRIME. It is impossible to quantify
such abstracts as "combat readiness," "retaliatory power," and
"esprit de corps," in such a manner that they might be related
in a decision making process which purports to compare alternative
choices by weighing quantified versions of the several paths
which might be followed.
Supporting the judgment that one of the major pre-
requisites involved in Project PRIME is unattainable is the fact
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that at the other end of the management spectrum there is
indication of a closely related problem. This consideration does
not present a problem which, as in the first case, is virtually
unsolvable, but is indicative of a goal easily attainable but
of questionable value. The area of accounting under Project
PRIM3 is now addressed.
It is possible to account for the expenses of military
units down to the lowest level. It is the "accrual basis" of
this accounting which makes its value questionable. "What we
actually have is a reverse accrual accounting system . . . just
the opposite of what we want to achieve in Project PRIME. It is
an aree of great seriousness. It develops data too late to be
useful now, and does not associate expenses to period." The
question is raised as to what must be done to make accrued
expenses a factual, reliable tool for management? The problems
mentioned previously make it untenable to have a performance
measured under a program (for middle managers this might be
flying hours) which ends on December 31 but having the accrued
expenses associated therewith only through November 30 due to
accounting problems. Procedures under Project PRIMJS must be
amended so that either the reporting procedures for accrued
-^Captain R. H. Conn, from remarks made to Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) during a presentation of the




expenses are changed or the values expressed be discounted.
"The present system Is complex and costly. ... It is not good
management to report misleading or unusable data."^
The recommendations of the writer regarding this enigma
are essentially akin to those made by the group referenced in
the last footnote. This representation of knowledgeable
supervisors concluded relative to the talent required that,
. . .
V.'e must correct our accounting and reporting
procedures regarding "accrued expenses.' 1 The
importance of accrual accounting is not diminished,
but it must be made to work for the manager. Its
importance is made clear when we consider that it
directly affects the main aspects of ^thi§7 system,
namely a basis for costing programs . . . providing
management information for higher headquarters
. . .
and as a basis for comparison of cost
variances .2
The significance of accrual accounting dictates that it
be made a viable portion of this management system. The changes
which can be made relative to this end go hand in hand with those
to be recommended in the following paragraphs. The system must
be revised so as to reflect changes made in accordance with ooth
their importance for top management and those managers on lower
levels. Situations repeated appear in the field whereunder
strict accounting on an accrual basis is both impractical and
too costly when viewed as a part of the total system. The value
^Captain P. D, Johnson, Record of i-iinutes of Project Prime
Steering/Evaluation Group, p. 38.
2 Ibid ., p. 39.
3Ibld
. . p. 41.
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of the information is questionable based both on its accuracy
and its timeliness. Dr. Anthony pointed out in his early
writings concerning Project PR 1MB that the expenses charged had
to be "reasonably measurable." 2 This mandate afforded the system
with some measure of flexibility, but the areas to which this
flexibility is extended must be enlarged to achieve the full
potential of Project PRIM
aother of the considerations brought to light was a lack
of trained personnel. The critical shortage of personnel trained
in the field of administering this system has been the subject
of lengthy discussion on all levels of management. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) said in this regard,
We are reducing the gap created when Project
PR 1MB was initiated without having previously
trained people to fill the new assignments in the
field of accounting. However, it will continue to
be a problem area in the foreseeable future.
3
One of the efforts to close this gap has been given unanimous
approval by middle managers interviewed . This program is called
the "College Graduate Training Program" under which college
graduates who are inducted into the Marine Corps are assigned to
a school in San Diego wherein they receive instruction in
-'-Commanding General, Marine Corps Schools, ^uantico,
Virginia to Commandant of the Marine Corps, February, 1969.
2Robert N. Anthony, "Closing the Loop," address made to
Financial Management Roundtable, rtashington, D. C, October,
1966.
•^Mr. William Boucher, address to Students of Navy Post-
graduate Financial Management Program, The George Washington
University, rtashington, D. C, March 4, 1969.
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accounting and other related aspects of Project PR1MB, Upon
completion of this school they are assigned to various billets
in both top and middle management areas. The basic deficiency
in this program is that there are not enough qualified
individuals to fill the requirements created by Project
Middle managers interviewed were nearly unanimous in their
opinion that the caliber of individual required to fill the
position of "accountsman" is considerably above that which is
ordinarily available through normal channels of recruiting, and
that the problem of providing qualified personnel for billets
requiring selected talents will remain with the system.
The writer has alluded to motivation as being an
important consideration in implementing Project PRIME. Since
this is a general, overall matter it vail be treated prior to
succeeding specifics regarding remedial measures which can be
taken in an effort to make this system more effective, however,
the matter of motivation crosses the entire gamut of these
considerations. The writer indicated he felt that the vast
majority of middle managers in the Marine Corps lack proper
motivation and that it was in large measure due to a lack of
understanding on their part. Mr. George W. Berquist, in a
speech made at the Pentagon, expressed it this way,
lCommanding General, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,
Virginia to Commandant of the Marine Corps, February, 1969.
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The underlying problem /regarding Project
PR IM37 that remains is beyond all ingenuity and
technical skills, and imagination and consultant
assistance and field tests and all the rest; it is
the perpetual problem of motivation and resistance
to change. The sheer size of the Department is port
of the problem. The four color uniforms are another.
. . . Everyone is for change, but for the other
fellow. "I don't understand. We've always done it
another way." These are the questions and remarks
that constitute our main challenge and our
continuing problem.
The writer agrees. An undertaking calling for such
enormous change in such a short time is a challenge which cannot
possibly reach full potential without the cooperation of all
those Involved. The examples cited in previous chapters
indicated that many in the area of middle management erroneously
judged the degree to which they would be participating, and as
a result developed a negative attitude regarding Project
One major cause of this attitude must be attributed to the formal
and informal education efforts made in the Marine Corps.
Referring once again to the lesson plans and publications
relative to Resources Management- -they are excellent in their
presentation of the conceptual and major issues involved.
However, the relationship of Budgeting, Programming and Planning
is of relatively little use to a middle manager unless he is
1George W. Berquist, "Better Ways of Doing Business in
the Department of Defense," an address delivered at the Pentagon,
Washington, D. 0., July 28, 1967.
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appraised of how it will affect him. In the matter of motivation,
it is as important to state how it will not relate to him as a
commander. Attempts to educate managers must distinguish between
those managers dealing with programs and those in the middle
scale who will be dealing with a system very similar to that
previously in use.
Related to matter of motivation and education is the
consideration of continued participation by managers who are
knowledgeable and actually operating under this system. ;/hen a
commander is urged to be efficient as well as effective, the
system itself does not provide a stimulus for continued
improvement. For example, if a commander is able to reduce his
operating expenses by 10 per cent and the only tangible result
for him is that his next year's budget is reduced by that amount,
it might be easily deduced that his motivation would wane, iiven
under optimal operation of this system it is still people and
not the system who are doing the managing. The relationship of
commander and subordinate has not been altered. Morale is still
his responsibility.
The reader is referred to the initial paragraphs wherein
the writer attempted to create an appropriate relationship
between the opinions forwarded herein and the unselfish efforts
made by senior officials who are supervising the installation of
this management in the Department of Defense. The following
comments are made in full appreciation of their competence and
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are not intended as a reflection on their efforts.
The costs of implementing Project PRIME have far exceeded
the original estimates. Since the Congress has not approved
additional funds as requested the costs must be borne by the
operating forces. In an era of distrust concerning military
appropriations this can result in a decrease of resources
actually applied to missions directly involving the defense
effort. The congressional attitude toward the unilateral
Implementation of PRIME as originally proposed has mellowed to
a great degree. However, it remains a precarious undertaking to
present the actual costs of the system to date in comparison
to the savings realized as a result of its operation. This
unenviable task must be performed. There is indication that
proponents fail to state that optimum application of this
management system achieves economy of force, and not necessarily
of the dollar. PRIME has enabled us to bring order to a
disjointed process in which millions of dollars were spent in
such a way that it could not accurately be determined what was
purchased.
The middle manager will bear the brunt of continued
implementation of PRIME without adequate funds. In his interest
and that of integrity in the entire matter, Congress must be
appraised and asked for the additional resources required for




In this regard and relative to the aforementioned problems
of motivation among middle managers, top management must appraise
middle managers of the progress made in this regard and all
others related to them as middle managers under Project PRIMS.
The terms "making suitable progress," and "encountering the
expected difficulties" must be diminished in favor of more
specific addressals of the problems of middle managers by top
management. The PRIMS survey teams and the field visits they
make can be the implements by which these goals are achieved.
However, the use of briefings by the highest headquarters
involved is not fully satisfactory. These presentations are
necessary, but only equally so when compared to visits to the
offices of the middle managers under that command. The necessity
of privileged comments is obvious. The writer has concluded as
a result of associated research that middle managers feel
divorced from the system as a whole. A personal Interest,
expressed in writing or in personal contact, is the most effective
weapon for eliminating this deficiency.
Project PRIMS has provided a tool to middle management
which managers are not effectively utilizing. Most do not
understand it in its fullest implications and are more conversant
with the general concepts involved than with the effects they
have on day-to-day operations at their level of management.
Much can be gained in this regard by assiduously pursuing the
education of middle managers.
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The future of the military relative to Project PR I.
is not hazy or ill defined. The dollars and cents of national
security will be a concern of all managers during the foreseeable
future. How effectively the Resources Management Systems of
the Department of Defense operate are in great measure dependent
upon the efforts of the middle manager. The system is so huge
it approaches Incredulity. The money involved is a significant
portion of our nation's Gross National Product. The writer has
attempted via this paper to investigate this system as it relates
to middle managers in the Marine Corps. It is hoped that this
effort has created for them a better perspective from which they
can view their efforts as they relate to this significant venture




Answers to the following questions are solicited as a
part of the research for a thesis I am required to submit in
connection with the Navy Postgraduate Financial Management Course
at The George Washington University, Washington, D. G.
The information sought is in connection with the
performance of Middle Managers in the Marine Corps relative to
Project PRIME management systems. The answers provided on the
questionnaire are to expedite completion of the form, but I
earnestly solicit any comment from you which clarifies your
position on the questions asked. No direct quotations will be
made of these comments without your permission.










2. My assignment (s) as a manager under Project PRIME are (were)














3. Do you feel you have adequate knowledge concerning
Project PRIH3 to perform duties as a manager
thereunder:
Y"es, 1 am entirely confident of my grasp of the
concepts and practical application of the system.
Yes, but I feel that there are specific areas
in which I am not certain as to their
application to the Commander. (Please mention
these areas—e.g., accounting)
Unanswered
4. One of the areas in which appraisals of Project
PRIME have been most favorable is that which
concerns making the commander more cost conscious?
Has this been your experience?
If so, in what area have you been more conscious






5. Project PR L4S is theoretically a two-sided system
One aspect concerns itself with providing top
management with information relative to decisions
made at that level; the other is to provide you,
the middle manager, with management information
by which you can better manage your command.
Has this second aspect of the system been
valuable to you?
a. Kot in my experience.
b. Sometimes, but not to any appreciable extent,
c. .Never.




6. Relative to the above question, has your primary
concern been more:
a. Providing management information for higher
headquarters. 26_
b. Both providing and using management
information. 5_
c. Other (please comment)
7. Middle managers have given general support to
another aspect of Project PRIME— that of its
providing a more efficient managerial tool in
budget preparation and submission. Do you agree
with this generalization?
a. Yes. It is a definite aid on budget
submission and control. 26_
b. No. The budget proposals of middle managers
are not significant and for the most part
are dictated by higher headquarters. 4,
c. Other (please comment) 1_
8. A previous question referred to the aspect of
Project PRIME with which you felt most at ease.
Please comment on that portion concerning which








9. My research thus far regarding Project ER1JKE
and middle managers indicates that there Is
a vast difference of opinion regarding the use
of the system by those in the middle management
ranks who are assigned to units preparing for
direct combat, e.g., infantry battalion,
squadron, etc. What is your opinion?
a. it is of limited value to such a unit. 22.
b. These units are no different from any
other and can be managed more
efficiently under Project P3IMS 8.
c. Other (please comment
10. The writer has found that performance by middle
managers has been criticized by top management.
The previous questions have alluded to "middle
manager." Do you have a clear and distinct
judgment regarding middle management in the
Marine Corps? Are, for example, you a middle
manager ?
a. it depends upon the individual assignment. 8_
b. The term refers to those officers below
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. 12.
c. The term refers to those officers below
the rank of Major. 4_
d. The term has no meaning in the Marine
Corps relative to Project PRIMS.
e. The performance of a Marine officer is
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